1 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 1 August 1969

DD/I called attention to a Special Report, The Technological Gap: USSR Lags Behind the Developed West, and noted that several hundred workhours of basic research went into this piece.

Godfrey reported that we have no official information with which to support the item in today's New York Times on the takeover of the radio station in Cordoba, Argentina.

D/ONE called attention to the San Francisco Chronicle story of 26 July on Sherman Kent's talk before the Commonwealth Club of California. He added that he received a note from Sherman Kent which took some exception to the accuracy of the article.

25X1

Maury reported that the DD/S&T appearance before the Zablocki Subcommittee yesterday went well, with only Congressmen Zablocki, Fraser, and Bingham attending.

*The Director noted his appointment Monday morning with Senator Eastland and asked Maury to attend and to prepare a brief file of items of possible interest to Senator Eastland.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

DDCI noted the Saigon station's after-action report of operations in support of the Presidential visit (Saigon 2015). He outlined steps he may be able to take which will avoid the mechanical problems attributed to MACV with regard to confusion caused by helicopter movements.

The Director called attention to an item in the 29 July Christian Science Monitor by Saville R. Davis on the President's new Asia policy.

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[redacted]

for L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

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[redacted]

Argentine Rebels Seize Radio And Demand Ongania's Ouster

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

BUENOS AIRES, July 31—Armed rebels, believed to have had at least tacit backing from elements of the Argentine armed forces, seized a radio station in the city of Cordoba today and broadcast a demand for the resignation of President Juan Carlos Onganéa.

The incident underscored an impression here of widespread unrest within the armed forces, and many observers were speculating that a coup or military power play against the President was imminent.

According to reports from Córdoba—the scene of bloody street battles between troops and workers two months ago — the Córdoba radio was seized early this morning by a group of about 10 men led by the station's news director, Dr. Guillermo Marquez Alonso.

The station is only about 50 yards from Córdoba's police headquarters, but the rebels completed a broadcast of about 20 minutes without interference from the authorities.

Chief Was Asked to Join

The police chief is reported to have told Córdoba newsmen later that the rebels had first asked him to join them, and that he had refused and ordered them out of the police station.

It was not explained why they were not arrested.

The broadcast demanded that the military government in Buenos Aires name a new President and Vice President, and that President Ongania place himself under arrest. It called on the President to turn himself over to presidential guards as a prisoner within six hours.

President Ongania is currently taking a brief vacation in the mountain resort town of Bariloche.

Members of the Cordoba rebel group were believed by local observers to include several retired right-wing army offices, including Brig. Gen. Cayo Alsina and Brig. Gen. Gilberto Oliva. General Oliva and another of the alleged participants in the raid were arrested later today.

Earlier this week, the Government accepted the resignation of Gen. Eduardo Rafael Labanca as commander of the 10th Infantry Brigade of the First Army garrison at Palermo, a suburb of Buenos Aires.

General Labanca was forced to retire after having given a speech at an officers' luncheon in which he was reported to have criticized the regime.

Military observers believe that General Labanca merely reflected the views of a wide circle of junior officers who may have been plotting a coup in recent weeks.

San Francisco Chronicle
26 July 1969

Some 'Melancholy Times'

Insider's Defense of CIA

By Elmont Waite

The Central Intelligence Agency has had its "melancholy times," but still is the best organization of its kind in the world, one of its former executives, Sherman Kent, said here yesterday.

Kent, who retired in 1967 as chairman of CIA's Board of National Estimates, spoke at a luncheon meeting of the Commonwealth Club of California at the Sheraton-Palace Hotel.

Among CIA's "melancholy times," Kent listed the U-2 incident, the U.S. spy plane downed in the era of the President Eisenhower; the more recent Pueblo capture by North Koreans; and, under the late President Kennedy, the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

APPLAUSE

Still, he told his applauding audience, "I rate United States Intelligence as the best in the world."

It does this job, he said, by "keeping almost every corner of the world under constant watch," by checking radio transmissions, newspapers and other publications, by much research — and, of course, by spying.

How good a job is being done now? "The answer; from this highly prejudiced source, is a very good job. We do not know how many missiles would head for the United States from Russia if the Soviet Union's No. 1 boss pushed the red button — but we do know a lot of facts and can make an estimate. . ."

INTELLIGENCE

By the phrase "United States Intelligence," he said, he meant the joint efforts of the CIA, plus intelligence agencies of the Department of Defense, State Department, Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI —the latter limited to work within continental boundaries on reported foreign espionage here.

The total cost? "I haven't the foggiest notion."

Is the CIA better now than in its early days after World War II, or at the time of the Bay of Pigs fiasco? "The answer is an unequivocal yes."

CHANGES

The major changes, he said, have been in "the technological collection of information . . . sensitive machines. . ."

"A lot of things have changed since the Bay of Pigs," he added. But he said it was "sad to relate", that some of the changes involved putting new faces in the CIA's topmost positions — among other switches, the replacement of the former CIA chief Allen Dulles.

The Bay of Pigs invasion, Kent said, "wasn't cooked up in the CIA director's office — it followed discussions in President Kennedy's office, in many conferences."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 JUL 1969

Nixon turns corner

U.S. Asia policy 'supple, adaptable'

By Saville R. Davis
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

With Nixon in Asia

It is possible now to report with confidence what could only be guessed at before: that the United States has in fact radically changed its Asian policy, making a clear break with the past, and that it has a new fully developed, clearcut policy which already is being put to the test.

Events are developing far more rapidly here than anyone outside the innermost policymaking circle of the White House could have foretold. The reason is that until President Nixon reached Asia, he had not spoken out himself. It was thus not possible to tell whether he had bought the new strategy painstakingly worked out by his advisers.

It now is apparent that he has.

In a series of informal talks with the accompanying White House press, the President has gone much further than any of his advisers had, in public or confidentially, to show that he has a thoroughly new, firm, and comprehensive policy in hand.

The process began with his background conference at Guam. It continued through several of his public remarks on entering and leaving the various countries, and in talks with reporters aboard his airplane, Air Force 1, in flight.

By now the various pieces have fallen into a pattern. Its principal ingredients have been reported in previous dispatches in these columns. But no quick account does justice to the thoroughly crafted policy that now emerges and that has enabled Mr. Nixon to talk with unexpected ease in answer to detailed questions by reporters.

It is not enough to say that the United States will encourage the emerging nationalism of Asian countries and the willingness of these countries to defend themselves; that the United States will pull back to a reserve military position in the area and intervene—except for a few special cases—only if there is major aggression; and that it will try to develop a live-and-let-live policy toward Communist China, and to ease the great ideological division that has caused high tensions, polarized Asia, and sparked the Vietnam war.

These are only the main propositions of a policy that deals with a wide range of possibilities in a highly complex Asian picture. The policy extends from basic principles all the way down, in stages and with various options, to detailed situations.

Fortunately it is spread on the public record for Americans who know where to find it. The concerned citizen would do well to obtain and study the remarkable essay entitled "Transpacific Relations" by the former ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, in the Book Agenda for the Nation, published by the Brookings Institution.

It reads like a top-secret-policy document of the Nixon administration. With very few reservations it tallies with what the President now is saying with unusual candor.

It appears as if the President has devoured it, and made it his own, and was enabled thereby to talk with clarity and confidence as he made his way through Southeast Asia.

Reaction pondered

It is rare that the United States has installed a wholly new foreign policy with such a clear grasp of what it is doing. Whether it works or how it works, and what the Asian reaction will be after the initial turmoil of adjusting to it, remain to be tested by events.

But the course is set for the present not as an American master plan but as a supple and adaptable program for applying basic concepts to events as they develop.

The credit for this unusual situation goes to the President for adopting it, and to his principal adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, for winning acceptance at the highest policy levels.

Another essay in the Brookings volume, innocently entitled "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy" by Mr. Kissinger, sets forth the concepts that are fully developed by the Reischauer document.

It cannot be repeated too often that for better or worse, for richer or poorer, the Kissinger thesis is that the vital flaw in past American policy was to let it be overwhelmed by daily pressures of the sort that Mr. Nixon is meeting in Asia and therefore to drift far off course. Daily actions, he constantly repeats, must be made to conform to long-range goals. This is the leading characteristic of the new Asian policy, and the reason for the air of decision that marks the historic change of policy Mr. Nixon has been explaining.

Regional response stressed

No rational observer here in Southeast Asia could attempt to predict how well or poorly the new policy line will work, or even how well it will be applied.

Much depends on the response of the Asians themselves, and much hangs on the assumption that Communist China is not in a position just now to take major advantage of the new program in its vulnerable infancy.

Much also hangs on whether the United States is willing to muster the the resources for economic-development aid that are not available now and can spare them from its towering domestic needs for use abroad.

A great deal also depends on the steadiness of Mr. Nixon himself when the pres-

continued

sures of events and of conventional military judgment get thick.

What is recorded here is the fact of carefully thought-out policymaking and the attempt to apply it incisively.

Hard-headed appraisal

The new policy should not be thought of as ideologically soft, preceeding merely from the current revulsion of American opinion against the frustrations of the Vietnam war. Factually, it is a hard-headed appraisal of grimly realistic military and political conditions that face the United States in Asia.

Had it not been grounded in solid military as well as political analysis, it would not have had a chance of being accepted at the top level of the American government today.

The new policy line will probably be ranked in future as a historic assertion of political and civilian values over the great and often unchecked power that the American military establishment has accumulated since World War II. But it will not be judged, if present trends continue, as a merely negative and emotional turning away from military involvement, however important that element may have been in American public opinion.

And in winding up the Vietnam war, it does not yet provide a realistic program for reducing and altering, but not eliminating, the use of American power in Asia.

Background sketched

It is the existence of a firm military component to the new program, albeit under very different rules that reject automatic close-in military involvement, that enables the President to "reassure" the Asian leaders as he puts it and to explain that he does not intend to scuttle and run.

The epic nature of this moment of transition is found in the fact that a concept long nurtured by a large group of thinkers in the field of foreign policy as an alternative to the cold war now is being put to the practical test.

Setback recalled

They hold that the rising force of nationalism in Asia has reached the point where it is more powerful than any military force—other than overt aggression by a great power—in resisting the spread of communism. They argue that the American policy of rushing armies into countries where there is Communist-supported civil rebellion has in fact been counterproductive in the test case of Vietnam. It has raised the level of Chinese and Soviet intervention and sapped the ability of Vietnamese nationalism to resist. Reversing this process is admittedly risky and this is the nature of the trial run that lies ahead for the new policy.

Fortunately for its advocates the test comes after the setback which Czechoslovak nationalism administered to the Soviet Union in its own front yard, forcing the Russians to highly unpopular steps to recover technical control.

Such an event inside the Communist world has served to strengthen those who say Asian countries can [illegible] have a better chance of thwarting Communist control or subversion than had been generally thought possible. Similarly it is argued that the Asia of today is far more sophisticated than even a decade ago when Chinese forces moved in on India's northeast frontiers.

The pro-Chinese form of neutralism that had governed that country's attitudes dissolved overnight and a fierce nationalism sprang up in its place. The failure of the Communist coup in Indonesia produced a similar reaction, even to the point of terrible reprisals. Without straining the argument by less dramatic examples, it is felt the Asia of today is ready for the new approach--ready for a self-defense that would make American intervention with its wake of destruction, illustrated in Vietnam, highly undesirable.

Propositions contested

One Indonesian observer, for example, suggested the abrupt descent of a typically overorganized American security cavalcade on his country, along with the American President, illustrated the reasons why Indonesia would decline to be involved with Americans in anything but economic aid.

These propositions, still fiercely contested by traditionally conservative military and cold-war political thinking in the United States, now are in the first stages of taking over as formal United States policy, backed by a President who needs no act of Congress to apply them.

An experiment of great magnitude, measured in the terms of history, has begun.

Flurry of excitement

There was a flurry of excitement as Mr. Nixon arrived here to reassure the Thai leaders of American support for their exposed position, with trouble in neighboring Laos and from subversives within.

Talking without notes he reiterated his statement at Guam that the United States would honor its Southeast Asia Treaty Organization commitments. And after some general language about the two countries standing together, he added: "And the United States will stand proudly with Thailand against those who might threaten it from abroad or from within."

This seemed contrary to his Quam statement that internal subversion would not be a cause for American military involvement.

Questions were raised as to whether the President was again putting the United States on the road to "creeping involvement" when the dust was settled. Allowing for some clumsy wording, it seemed clear he was not, and that the firm lines of his new policy had not been blurred.

That policy included "case-by-case" handling of specific situations, and Thailand certainly was a special case. It was pointed out that the Thais had not asked for any military help to deal with their internal subversives, and that the President had promised "support" but had not defined what kind.

A statement was issued in which the President quite frankly told his Thai listeners about his new policy and said that "honoring our commitments" was "fully

continued

consistent" with his conviction that they "must increasingly shoulder the responsibility for peace" in their area.

The flurry subsided, and the President's new Asian policy stood intact, even in this exposed bastion of Thailand.